



Capitalocene, and the Climate 
Crisis
Sam Adelman
This chapter discusses grand narratives, myths and discourses 
in the Anthropocene during and beyond modernity. The two 
main protagonists are abstractions to which responsibility has 
been ascribed for the climate and ecological crisis confronting 
humanity, other species, and the Earth system: Anthropos, the 
telluric super-agent who has produced a new geological epoch, 
and capital. The first section of this chapter discusses the emer-
gence of the grand narrative of the Anthropocene. In section 
two, I discuss the Anthropocene in relation to the dominant 
tropes of modernity on science, reason and progress, and the 
intersection between modernity and capitalism. I pay particu-
lar attention to the idea of progress as and through economic 
growth, ecomodernism, and neoliberalism. Section three ex-
amines some of the grand narratives of the Anthropocene, the 
Age of Humans. These include: naturalist, post-nature, eco-cat-
astrophist, and eco-Marxist (Capitalocene) narratives. The pe-
nultimate section considers problems created by the persistence 
of what I call Holocene rationality. In the concluding section, I 
argue that the Anthropocene is an age of unreason that we must 
transcend in pursuit of a great awakening.
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1. The Emergence of the Anthropocene Narrative
Natural scientists use the concept of the Anthropocene to high-
light the rupture of the Earth System.1 In 2002, Nobel chemistry 
laureate, Paul Crutzen, popularized the concept when arguing 
that “[i]t seems appropriate to assign the term ‘Anthropocene’ 
to the present, in many ways human-dominated, geological 
epoch.”2 Crutzen contended that the Anthropocene was argu-
ably inaugurated by James Watt’s refinement of the steam en-
gine between 1763 and 1775, which enabled the widespread use 
of coal as a source of energy and launched the Industrial Revo-
lution.3 Others suggest that humankind became a full-fledged 
Promethean, telluric force during the Great Acceleration:
The second half of the twentieth century is unique in the 
entire history of human existence on Earth. Many human 
activities reached take-off points sometime in the twentieth 
century and have accelerated sharply towards the end of the 
century. The last 50 years have without doubt seen the most 
rapid transformation of the human relationship with the nat-
ural world in the history of humankind.4
1 Clive Hamilton, “The Anthropocene as Rupture,” The Anthropocene 
Review 3, no. 2 (2016): 93–106, at 94. Hamilton describes Earth System as 
an “integrative meta-science of the whole planet as a unified, complex, 
evolving system beyond the sum of its parts.” 
2 Paul Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind” Nature 415, no. 4687 (2002): 23. In 
2000, Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer had introduced the concept in the 
newsletter for the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme in 
which they described the ways in which mankind had become a “signifi-
cant geological, morphological force”: Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer, 
“The ‘Anthropocene’,” Global Change Newsletter 41 (2000): 17–18.
3 Watt improved the steam engine invented by Thomas Newcomen in 1712.
4 W. Steffen et al., Global Change and the Earth System: A Planet under 
Pressure (Berlin: Springer, 2005), 131. See also Will Steffen et al., “The Tra-
jectory of the Anthropocene: The Great Acceleration,” The Anthropocene 
Review 2, no. 1 (2015): 81–98.
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Whichever periodization is favoured, it is widely accepted that 
Homo sapiens is altering the geo-history of the Earth.5 Future 
geologists will find evidence in the planet’s stratigraphy of radio-
nuclides from nuclear weapons testing, greenhouse gas emis-
sions, the 300 metric tonnes of plastic produced annually, and 
enough concrete to cover the surface of the planet — more than 
half of which has been produced in the past two decades.6 In ad-
dition to anthropogenic climate change, seven other planetary 
boundaries have been breached or are under threat.7 Nearly half 
the Earth’s land surface has been transformed by human activity 
during the Great Acceleration, with significant impacts on nu-
trient cycling, biodiversity, ecosystems, and soil structure. More 
than half of accessible freshwater is utilized directly or indirectly 
by human beings, and underground water resources are being 
rapidly depleted.8
The idea of the Anthropocene is gaining increasing purchase 
in the academy and public discourse as a shorthand for the 
power of human agency in the Age of Humans. It is a power-
ful trope — indeed, an overarching grand narrative — about the 
climatic harms caused by overweening arrogance, hubris and 
5 The International Commission on Stratigraphy has yet to decide whether 
to accept the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch as proposed by 
the Working Group on the Anthropocene that began its work in 2009. 
Periodizations are inevitably contested. Proponents of the Capitalocene, 
such as Moore, argue that it can be traced back as far as the emergence 
of mercantile capitalism in the sixteenth century: Jason W. Moore, “The 
Capitalocene, Part I: On the Nature and Origins of Our Ecological Crisis,” 
The Journal of Peasant Studies 44, no .3 (2017): 594–630.
6 The total amount of concrete produced by humanity is about 1 kg/m2 
across the whole surface of the Earth. Enough plastic wrap has been 
manufactured since 1950 to cover the whole Earth, and enough aluminium 
foil to cover Australia: Will Steffen, “Welcome to the Anthropocene,” 
Australasian Science 37, no. 2 (2016): 28–29. More than 8 million tonnes 
of plastic are dumped into the oceans annually, see Plastic Oceans, http://
www.plasticoceans.org/the-facts/. Stratigraphy is both a branch of geology 
and an archeological record of human activity.
7 Johan Rockström et al., “Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operat-
ing Space for Humanity,” Ecology and Society 14, no. 2 (2009): 32–65.
8 Ian Angus, Facing the Anthropocene: Fossil Capitalism and Crisis of the 
Earth System (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2016), ch. 2.
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greed, and the onto-epistemological challenges that climate 
change poses to our understandings of what it means to be hu-
man in geo-human history.9 Like Donna Haraway, I use the 
concept despite deep reservations. I use Anthropocene because, 
in Haraway’s words, “the word is already well entrenched and 
seems less controversial to many important players compared to 
the Capitalocene.”10 (Haraway argues that both narratives “lend 
themselves too readily to cynicism, defeatism, and self-certain 
and self-fulfilling predictions.”)11 For a start, the idea that an 
undifferentiated humanity is responsible for the rupture in the 
Earth System is historically inaccurate. Most of the individuals 
historically responsible for carbon dioxide emissions — the su-
per-agents of the Anthropocene — are from developed, indus-
trialized, Western countries.12 Bonneuil and Fressoz note that 
“Great Britain and the United States made up 60% of cumulative 
total emissions to date in 1900, 57% in 1950, and almost 50% in 
1980. From the standpoint of climate, the Anthropocene should 
rather be called the ‘Anglocene’.”13 According to Malm and Horn-
borg, “In the early 21st century, the poorest 45% of the human 
population accounted for 7% of emissions, while the richest 7% 
9 Some writers are already discussing the possibility that the Anthropocene 
may be an interlude that will be succeeded by yet to be named epoch. See 
for example, Luc Semal, “Anthropocene, Catastrophism and Green Politi-
cal Theory,” in The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis: 
Rethinking Modernity in a New Epoch, eds. Clive Hamilton, Christophe 
Bonneuil, and François Gemenne (London: Routledge, 2015), 87–99.
10 Donna Haraway, “Tentacular Thinking: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, 
Chthulucene,” e-flux 75 (2016), http://www.e-flux.com/journal/75/67125/
tentacular-thinking-anthropocene-capitalocene-chthulucene/.
11 Donna J. Haraway, “Staying with the Trouble: Anthropocene, Capitalo-
cene, Chthulucene,” in Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and 
the Crisis of Capitalism and the Crisis of Capitalism, ed. Jason W. Moore 
(Oakland: PM Press, 2016), 34–76, at 59.
12 The idea of super-agency is borrowed from Clive Hamilton, Defiant Earth: 
The Fate of Humans in the Anthropocene (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2017).
13 Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthro-
pocene: The Earth, History and Us (London: Verso, 2016), 132.
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produced 50%.”’14 From the start of the Industrial Revolution to 
the last quarter of the twentieth century, the climate catastrophe 
was overwhelmingly the responsibility of white, bourgeois and 
predominantly Christian men.15 Anna Grear argues that An-
thropos is a narrow, self-interested figure that excludes most of 
humanity and all of nature. For this reason, the Anthropocene is 
also a crisis of hierarchies. Grear maintains that:
any ethically responsible future engagement with “anthro-
pocentrism” and/or with the “Anthropocene” must explic-
itly engage with the oppressive hierarchical structure of the 
anthropos itself — and should directly address its apotheosis 
in the corporate juridical subject that dominates the entire 
globalised order of the Anthropocene age.16
In an influential essay, Dipesh Chakrabarty argues that human 
history and geological history have converged as an unintended 
consequence of individual greenhouse gas emissions undiffer-
entiated by class, gender, race or historical context. “Species,” he 
writes, “may indeed be the name of a placeholder for an emer-
gent, new universal history of humans that flashes up in the 
moment of the danger that is climate change.”17 Chakrabarty’s 
“speciesism” disconnects the Anthropocene from the underly-
ing structures of social and environmental exploitation such as 
colonialism and capitalism.
14 Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind?” The An-
thropocene Review 1, no. 1 (2014): 62–69, at 64.
15 Rapidly industrializing countries in the global South are responsible for 
a growing proportion of greenhouse gas emissions but their historical 
responsibility is far lower than that of OECD member states.
16 Anna Grear, “Deconstructing Anthropos: A Critical Legal Reflection on 
‘Anthropocentric’ Law and Anthropocene ‘Humanity’,” Law and Critique 
26, no. 3 (2015): 225–49.
17 Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical 
Inquiry 5, no. 2 (2009): 197–222, at 221. See Malm and Hornborg, “Geol-




This gives rise to a second reservation, namely a tendency 
amongst many theorists of the Anthropocene to obscure or 
subordinate the contributions of capitalism and colonialism to 
the climate crisis. Jason Moore argues that the concept of the 
Anthropocene is problematic because it does not give sufficient 
weight to the ways in which a particular mode of production 
reinforced the anthropocentric epistemologies at the heart of 
modernity. For this reason, he argues that the term “Capitalo-
cene” more accurately captures the historical processes that 
have brought us to this conjuncture.18 Neither modernity nor 
the Anthropocene are comprehensible in the absence of the his-
tories of (carbon) colonialism and capitalism. As Bonneuil and 
Fressoz argue: 
[The] industrial development model and its metabolism in 
terms of matter and energy, which altered the geopolitical 
trajectory of our Earth, is inseparable from the history of 
capitalist world-systems, of unequal ecological exchange, of 
colonialism and imperialism, of exploitation and underde-
velopment.19
2. The Grand Narratives of Modernity
Bruno Latour contends that the Anthropocene is “the most de-
cisive philosophical, religious, anthropological and […] politi-
cal concept yet produced as an alternative to the very notions of 
‘Modern’ and ‘modernity’.”20 This may be true if the Anthropo-
cene is understood as an intellectual era after and beyond mo-
18 Jason W. Moore, “Introduction” to Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, 
History, and the Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland: Pm Press, 2016).
19 Bonneuil and Fressoz, Shock of the Anthropocene, 228. See also Alf Horn-
borg, “Zero-Sum World: Challenges in Conceptualizing Environmental 
Load Displacement and Ecologically Unequal Exchange in the World-Sys-
tem,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 50, nos. 3–4 (2009): 
237–62.
20 Bruno Latour, “Facing Gaia: Six Lectures on the Political Theology of Na-




dernity. However, it is chronologically untrue if we accept that 
the Anthropocene began around the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury and thus overlapped with, and was indeed largely impelled 
by, modernity’s faith in science and particular forms of rational-
ity and progress that we might term “Holocene epistemologies”. 
Ecological devastation has clearly intensified during the Great 
Acceleration, the beginning of which is often traced back to the 
1950s, but whose foundations were laid two centuries earlier.21
The concept generally described as modernity had its origins 
in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. A central component 
of modernity is the idea that Europe had launched humanity 
on an irreversible linear, progressive, and teleological trajectory 
towards the future through a radical rupture — an onto-epis-
temological rupture with the past impelled by equally radical 
previous ruptures, most notably the Cartesian rupture between 
nature and society and that between feudalism and capitalism. 
In Latour’s words:
Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or 
journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, 
to the passage of time. The adjective “modern” designates a 
new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time. 
When the word “modern”, “modernization”, or “modernity” 
appears, we are defining, by contrast, an archaic and stable 
past.22
In addition to progress, modernity’s defining tropes include 
rationalism, secularism, technocentrism, and assertions of the 
discovery of absolute universal truths.23 The moderns’ Age of 
21 There is a danger of infinite regress in identifying the origins of the An-
thropocene as a geological epoch that has induced some writers to argue 
that it was initiated by agriculture.
22 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 10 (emphasis added).
23 Ellen Meiksins Wood writes: “The so-called Enlightenment project is 
supposed to represent rationalism, technocentrism, the standardization of 
knowledge and production, a belief in linear progress and universal, abso-
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Reason was also the age of humanism that celebrated individual 
agency and autonomy as well as the cognitive faculties of Eu-
ropeans. In the Holocene, modernity was also an apotheosis of 
human exceptionalism based upon a series of myths, to which 
we now turn.24
2.1 Reason and Science
The first of these myths celebrates the (reductive) modern faith 
in reason and science. The transition to Western modernity was 
driven by the conviction that the world could be shaped by hu-
man agency and reason rather than by the vicissitudes of nature 
or supernatural forces. Scientific method and Enlightenment 
rationality shaped Western socio-cultural norms and practices. 
In the seventeenth century, the Scientific Revolution gave rise 
to the perception of nature as inert and passive — a perception 
that infused the law and facilitated the mechanistic materialism 
that underpinned the Eurocentric Promethean impulse towards 
domination over alien others.25 Machines became structural 
models for Western epistemology and law.26 Separation, exclu-
sion and domination became persistent economic, legal, and 
political leitmotifs.
The rupture between humanity and nature was foundational 
to modernity. Francis Bacon argued that nature was an inani-
mate machine whose secrets could be extracted through tech-
nologies that would enable men to transform it “from a teacher 
lute truths”: “Modernity, Postmodernity, or Capitalism?” Monthly Review 
48, no. 3 (1996): 21–39, at 23.
24 The Holocene is the second and most recent epoch of the Quaternary 
period. It began approximately 11,700 years ago and is characterized by a 
stable climate that facilitated agriculture and the development of human 
civilizations.
25 Sam Adelman, “Epistemologies of Mastery,” in Research Handbook on Hu-
man Rights and the Environment, eds. A. Grear and L. Kotzé (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 9–27.
26 Fritjof Capra and Ugo Mattei, The Ecology of Law: Toward a Legal System 
in Tune with Nature and Community (Oakland: Berrett-Koehler, 2015).
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to a slave.”27 In 1641, Descartes introduced the idea of a division 
between the realm of the mind (res cogitans) and that of matter 
(res extensa), setting in play a dualism that continues to shape 
much of humanity’s engagement with the environment through 
a praxis of domination and alienation.28 Val Plumwood argues 
that such dualisms are relations of separation, domination, and 
exclusion, which generate hierarchies in which highly-valued 
constructs (men, humans) are contrasted with subordinate ones 
(women, nature). Identity is formed in a process “which distorts 
both sides of what it splits apart, the master and the slave, the 
coloniser and the colonised […] the masculine and the femi-
nine, human and nature.”29 Plumwood argues that the occiden-
tal relationship between people and nature: 
explains many of the problematic features of the west’s treat-
ment of nature which underlie the environmental crisis, es-
pecially the western construction of human identity as ‘out-
side’ nature.30 
In a similar vein, Lorraine Code maintains that:
The imperialism of overdeveloped countries imposing their 
knowledge, social orderings, customs, economics, and other 
values, with scant concern for local sensitivities of land or 
of people, is one of the most visible wide-ranging — anti-
ecological — products of the excesses of scientism, reduc-
tionism, and the instrumental-utilitarian moral and political 
theories that sustain an ethos of dominance and mastery.31
27 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scien-
tific Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 169.
28 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and the Meditations (London: Pen-
guin, 1968).
29 Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993), 32.
30 Ibid., 2.
31 Lorraine Code, Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 8. Alf Hornborg describes an 
alternative narrative to the Anthropocene in “The Political Ecology of the 
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Latour has argued that science, technology, and society are co-
produced through reciprocal changes in the relationships be-
tween facts, theories, machines, human actors, and social rela-
tions.32 In his view, there has never been a complete separation 
between human and non-human or nature and society. In We 
Have Never Been Modern, Latour contends that the “modern 
constitution” bequeathed to us by the likes of Robert Boyle and 
Thomas Hobbes was a programme for purifying the discourses 
of nature and society by purging all traces of each in the oth-
er. This process of modernity was intensified by secularisation 
and the construction of boundaries between academic disci-
plines — a project that failed because such a radical separation 
has never been possible: we could never be modern so long 
as we denied that nature and culture/society are inextricably 
entangled.33 Latour argues that science cannot exist without 
the contamination of its “pure space” by economics, law, and 
politics. His solution is a non-modern constitution for a “Par-
liament of Things”, in which natural and social phenomena are 
comprehended as hybrids that emerge through the interaction 
of concepts, people, practices, and objects.34 Hybridization is the 
diametric opposite of purification: everything of historical sig-
nificance occurs in a “middle kingdom” in which nature and so-
ciety are intermingled and includes such hybrids as genetically 
modified organisms, cybernetics and robotics.35 The nature-cul-
ture divide must therefore be reconceptualized as an assemblage 
of “nature-cultures,” which existed in premodernity and persist 
beyond modernity.36 Latour’s concern is that modernity cannot 
acknowledge the unavoidability of hybridization without col-
Technocene: Uncovering Ecologically Unequal Exchange in the World-
System,” in The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis, eds. 
Hamilton, Bonneuil, and Gemenne, 1–13.
32 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern.
33 Ibid.; Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engi-
neers through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1987).





lapsing back into premodern undifferentiation, which is why 
modernity must vigilantly maintain the myth of purification at 
all costs.37
Hybridity and fluidity are central aspects of Donna Hara-
way’s Chthulucene thinking about the onto-epistemological 
challenges of the Anthropocene. “What happens,” she asks:
[W]hen human exceptionalism and bounded individualism 
become unthinkable in the best sciences across the disci-
plines and interdisciplines? Seriously unthinkable: not avail-
able to think with. Why is it that the epochal name of the 
Anthropos imposed itself at just the time when understand-
ings and knowledge practices about and within symbiogen-
esis and sympoetics are wildly and wonderfully available and 
generative […]?38
Much of the literature on the Anthropocene is framed by the 
implications of the central illusion of Holocene rationality, but 
this framing does not necessarily translate into humble intel-
lectual acceptance of the consequences of what was always self-
evident to those with eyes to see. Modernist rationalism persists 
in its blind war, effectively denying ecological limits while en-
acting an accumulative logic of plunder and control.
While the rise of secularism destabilized religious and philo-
sophical orthodoxies and led to demands for greater individual 
autonomy and liberty which culminated in the American and 
37 Ibid.
38 Haraway in Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene?, 60–61. See also Dami-
an White, Alan Rudy, and Brian Gareau, Environments, Natures and Social 
Theory: Towards a Critical Hybridity (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 
Symbiogenesis is an evolution term that refers to cooperation between 
species to increase their chances of survival. Sympoetic evolutionary 
systems are collectively produced but do not have self-defined spatial or 
temporal boundaries. Information and control are distributed among their 
components. They have intrinsic potential for surprising change. On the 
latter, see Haraway’s description at KIASualberta, “Donna Haraway - SF: 
String Figures, Multispecies Muddles, Staying with the Trouble,” YouTube, 
June 27, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z1uTVnhIHS8.
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French revolutions), it also opened the way to possessive in-
dividualism, overturning centuries of commons land govern-
ance — a sea change that extended private property by legitimat-
ing the conquest of nature. Legally and politically, modernity 
was marked by the consolidation of land ownership — by the 
Westphalian state through sovereignty and patrimony over 
natural resources, and for individuals as private property. John 
Locke, for example, grounded his theory of individual property 
rights in the biblical injunction that commanded industrious 
and rational men to subdue the Earth, while John Stuart Mill 
argued that individual freedom and autonomy depended upon 
“a high degree of success in their struggle with Nature.”39 State 
sovereignty — for Hobbes, the basis of security and protection 
in the “war of all against all” in the state of nature40 — became 
the foremost facilitator of the sustained and unsustainable war 
against nature that today produces ecological instability every-
where. 
Max Horkheimer argued that mastery of nature is a pyrrhic 
victory that leads to disillusionment. The “disease of reason,” he 
declared, “is that reason was born from man’s urge to dominate 
nature.”41 With Theodor Adorno, he famously argued that the 
“dialectic of enlightenment” turns reason into an iron cage; at-
tempts by human beings to arrange nature for subjugation have 
the unintended consequence that the power of nature over peo-
ple “increases with every step they take away from the power 
of nature.”42 Reason produced wilful ignorance in the form of 
the quintessential delusion of modernity — the idea that nature 
39 Respectively, John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988), II.v.32, 290 and John Stuart Mill, Considera-
tions on Representative Government (1861; Lahore: Serenity Publishers, 
2008), 40.
40 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1985), 186.
41 Max Horkheimer, Dawn and Decline: Notes 1926–1931 and 1950–1969 
(New York: Seabury, 1978); Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason (Columbia: 
Columbia University Press, 1947), 176.
42 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 30–31.
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could be tamed, once considered to be the yardstick by which 
human freedom is measured — signified nothing so much as the 
constraints of fetishized science and reason.43 The underlying 
paradox of technologically-impelled progress is this: the expan-
sion of human powers, driven by hubristic delusions of mastery, 
progressively circumscribes those very powers due to increas-
ingly intense climate-related weather events.44 The Anthropo-
cene calls for humility in the face of existential threats such 
as global heating and pandemics but encounters the hubris of 
technological modernizers and the masters of the universe who 
annually gather in Davos. Modernity’s destructive delusions 
persist despite, or possibly because of the freedoms it brought.
Modernity provided a mixed legacy of real freedoms and 
Promethean delusions of mastery. While the natural rights of 
some were acknowledged but nowhere permanently guaran-
teed, capitalism generated technological innovations such as the 
steam engine that unleashed unconstrained economic growth 
and extractive industrialization. From the start of the Industrial 
Revolution, the prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic Europe 
brought by rising standards of living was accompanied by wide-
spread ecological destruction. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, Europeans were increasingly aware of rapid deforesta-
tion throughout the continent,45 while ecocide and genocide 
were prominent features of the “white man’s burden” of spread-
ing colonialism, imperialism, Christianity and modernity to the 
ends of the earth.46
The contradictions of modernity have not gone unaddressed. 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos contends that modernity is charac-
43 David Harvey, “The Fetish of Technology: Causes and Consequences,” 
Macalester International 13, no. 1 (2003): 3–30.
44 Caroline C. Ummenhofer and Gerald A. Meeh, “Extreme Weather and 
Climate Events with Ecological Relevance: A Review,” Philosophical Trans-
actions of the Royal Society B 372, no. 1723 (2017): 20160135.
45 Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, ch. 9.
46 In his 1899 poem “The White Man’s Burden: The United States and the 
Philippine Islands,” published in the New York Sun, Rudyard Kipling 
invites the United States to assume colonial control over the Philippines.
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terized by the tension between two pillars: regulation (exempli-
fied by science and law) and emancipation — and that regulation 
persistently overwhelms emancipation.47 These contradictions 
are exemplified by science. Science underpins material progress, 
not least through continuous innovations that enable nature to 
be “tamed,” giving rise to a particular way of knowing, but also, 
paradoxically, to the quintessentially modern faith in techno-
science as progress. Science, for example, provides rigorous and 
incontrovertible evidence of ecological devastation and fright-
ening, reductionist, “solutions” such as geoengineering. We rely 
on climate science in formulating demands for climate justice 
despite our awareness that scientific objectivity and neutrality 
promote technocratic and undemocratic responses which tend 
to ignore socio-economic and political factors.
Philippe Descola argues that “[t]he exaltation of Science as 
the archetype of valid knowledge and the transcendent source 
of truth inhibits any reflexive thought on this bizarre cosmol-
ogy that the Moderns have created.”48 The Age of Enlighten-
ment was simultaneously an age of unreason. The Anthropo-
cene is also an Agnotocene, a period of wilful ignorance.49 It 
was hubristic agnotology that greeted the fall of the Berlin Wall 
in 1989, exemplified by Fukuyama’s assertion that history had 
ended with its culmination in the form of capitalism and lib-
eral democracy.50 Such ignorance matters — decisive outcomes 
hang upon it. The implications for justice are serious. Santos et 
al. argue that there is no ignorance or knowledge in general and 
47 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, 
Globalization and Emancipation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002).
48 Philippe Descola, The Ecology of Others (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 
2013), 61.
49 From agnotology, the study of the production of zones of ignorance: 
Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, 198. In the Age of 
Unreason, moderns did not understand nature, misconstrued it, or chose 
wilful ignorance about their place in it.




that no complete knowledges exist.51 Because knowledges oper-
ate in constellations, global social justice is not possible without 
a global cognitive justice that accords equal respect to different 
epistemologies. Global social justice is thus made possible only 
by “substituting a monoculture of scientific knowledge by an 
ecology of knowledges.”52
2.2 Growth as Progress
We turn now to the second great myth of modernity. 
Donna Haraway writes that: 
A kind of dark bewitched commitment to the lure of Prog-
ress lashes us to endless infernal alternatives, as if we had no 
other ways to reworld, reimagine, relive, and reconnect with 
each other, in multispecies wellbeing.53 
Progress is a central ideological pillar of modernity, capitalism, 
and the Enlightenment, which has buttressed Western episte-
mologies since the Scientific Revolution (not least in the idea of 
development as modernization and economic growth).54 An as-
sociated aspect of this belief in progress is the notion that West-
ern rationalism has grasped and refined universal principles 
that govern everything. Likewise, the development of Europe 
was promoted as a universal pathway for humanity to follow 
on the basis that Europe’s individualistic credo was a globally 
applicable transcultural truth. The influence of such universaliz-
ing logics, especially of liberalism and capitalism, reached their 
51 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, João Arriscado Nunes, and Maria Paula 
Meneses, “Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Dif-
ference,” in Another Knowledge is Possible: Beyond Northern Epistemologies, 
ed. Boaventura de Sousa Santos (London: Verso, 2007), xx–lxii, at xlviii.
52 Ibid.
53 Donna Haraway, “Staying with the Trouble,” in Moore, Anthropocene or 
Capitalocene?, 54.
54 See Jorge Larrain, Theories of Development: Capitalism, Colonialism and 
Dependency (Malden: Polity, 2013); Richard Peet and Elaine Hartwick, 




apogee with the advent of neoliberalism in the last quarter of the 
twentieth century.
Progress narratives have, and always had, a dark side. Mod-
ern liberal notions of universal justice were developed through 
the construction of otherness and accompanied by the result-
ant exploitation, expropriation, and dispossession of such oth-
ers — including indigenous peoples, women, and nature. In 
short, the West’s development was contingent upon the under-
development of the rest of the world through political, econom-
ic and carbon colonialism, and ecologically unequal exchange.55 
As Malm and Hornborg argue, historical inequalities based 
upon the use of specific technologies made the Anthropocene 
possible, both as a mind-set and an epoch.56 Jeremy Baskin ar-
gues that the term Anthropocene:
reveals the power of humans, but it conceals who and what 
is powerful, and how that power is enacted. It draws “the hu-
man” into “nature” but not the multiple and unequal social 
values, relations and practices of power that accompany ac-
tual humans.57
In an analogous vein, Peter Fitzpatrick writes that:
Enlightenment creates the very monsters against which it 
so assiduously sets itself. These monsters of race and nature 
mark the outer limits, the intractable “other” against which 
Enlightenment pits the vacuity of the universal and in this 
opposition gives its own project a palpable content. Enlight-
55 See, for example, Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Lon-
don: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications, 1972). On carbon colonialism, see 
Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind?”
56 Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, “The Geology of Mankind?”
57 Jeremy Baskin, “Paradigm Dressed as Epoch: The Ideology of the Anthro-
pocene,” Environmental Values 24, no. 1 (2015): 9–29, at 16.
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ened being is what the other is not. Modern law is created in 
this disjunction.58
In exposing the mythology of modern law, Fitzpatrick describes 
how property becomes
the foundation of civilization, the very motor-force of the 
origin and development of society, the provocation to self-
consciousness and the modality of appropriating nature […]. 
What is being universalized here is a particular form of Oc-
cidental property. Where it is absent there can only be its pre-
cursors or savagery.59[…]
By 1800 the West already controlled over a third of the 
earth’s surface. With its expansive claim to exclusive rational-
ity, with its arrogation of a universal and uniform knowledge 
of the world, and with its affirmation of universal freedom 
and equality, the Enlightenment sets a fateful dimension.60
Richard Norgaard argues that the belief in progress is so deeply 
entrenched in modernism that questioning it risks accusations 
of backwardness. It contains
several aspects which have already terminated the future 
for many humanities and is likely to result in an early de-
mise for its perpetrators as well […] [T]he modern belief in 
progress was so strong during the nineteenth century that 
Western and westernized peoples lost much of their sense 
of responsibility for the earth and for future generations. We 
believed that progress through Western science would solve 
everything and thus that responsibility entailed accelerating 
the advance of science.61




61 Richard Norgaard, Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Co-
evolutionary Revisioning of the Future (London: Routledge, 1994), 44.
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Furthermore, progress is closely linked to the wilful pursuit of 
endless economic growth despite clear evidence that breach-
ing biophysical limits and planetary boundaries threatens all 
forms of economic activity.62 At least since the so-called Great 
Recession, the climate crisis and low growth have combined to 
undermine the belief that future generations would always be 
materially better off than their ancestors, the Western idea of 
progress is increasingly questioned, but still holds a powerful 
level of mythic force in the global legal order.
2.3 Capitalism and Development 
We turn now to the mythic status of the relationship between 
capitalism and development, which is the driving factor for so 
many contemporary social and ecological ills. Marx wrote that 
money that does not expand is not capital.63 Growth is thus the 
sine qua non of capitalism and the driving force behind ecologi-
cal rifts and the rupture to the Earth system.64 Capitalism can be 
traced back to sixteenth-century mercantilism and Europe’s co-
lonial expansion through the appropriation of slaves, land and 
natural resources. However, the advent of the Industrial Revolu-
tion and the emergence of the Anthropocene inaugurated 250 
years of carbon-based industrialization, urbanization, proletari-
anization, and technological transformation. By the end of the 
eighteenth century, capitalism had become the dominant global 
mode of production. And, as Horkheimer and Adorno argue, 
capitalism’s control fetish arises from the foundational Enlight-
62 There is a 5 per cent chance of staying within the 2°C target in the Paris 
Agreement by the end of the century with current economic, emissions 
and population trends, and just a 1 per cent chance that temperatures will 
rise by less than 1.5°C: Adrian E. Raftery et al., “Less Than 2°C Warming 
by 2100 Unlikely,” Nature Climate Change 7 (2017): 637–41. On the growth 
fetish, see Clive Hamilton, Growth Fetish (Crow’s Nest: Pluto Press, 2011). 
Richard Norgaard, Development Betrayed, 32 argues that modernity is the 
key driver of ecologically unsustainable practices.
63 Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1887), ch. 4.
64 John Bellamy Foster, Brett Clark, and Richard York, The Ecological Rift: 
Capitalism’s War on the Earth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2011).
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enment narrative of mastery over nature through instrumental 
reason.65
The “discovery” by the West of the Third World after the 
Second World War led to the emergence of developmental-
ism — an ideology rooted in progress measured by economic 
growth, industrialization and modernization.66 GDP — rather 
than justice or wellbeing — became the dominant measure of 
national virility. The West sought to universalize its model of 
development through capitalism — which has embedded within 
it Cartesianism, utilitarianism, anthropocentric axiology, and 
history, understood as linear and teleological progress from 
backwardness to modernity. Arturo Escobar observes that ques-
tioning development leads to accusations of implicitly calling 
modernity itself into question.67 The dominant contemporary 
narrative of development is sustainable development — a vague 
and capacious concept that appeals to states and transnational 
capital by fostering the illusion that endless economic growth, 
environmental protection, and the delivery of social justice 
through poverty reduction can be simultaneously achieved.68 
At the center of this hegemonic conception of development is 
the ecomodernist dream of deriving profits from a green econo-
my.69 The solution to the ecological depradations of capitalism, 
it seems, is more of the same.
65 Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment; Adelman, “Episte-
mologies of Mastery”.
66 Peet and Hartwick, Theories of Development, 3.
67 Arturo Escobar, “El post-desarrollo como concepto y práctica social,” in 
Políticas de Economía, ambiente y sociedad en tiempos de globalización, 
ed. Daniel Mato (Venezuela: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, 
Universidad Central de Venezuela, 2005), 17–31.
68 Sam Adelman, “The Sustainable Development Goals, Anthropocentrism 
and Neoliberalism,” in Global Goals: Law, Theory and Implementation, eds. 
Duncan French and Louis Kotzé (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018), 15–40.
69 Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto: 
From the Death of Environmentalism to the Birth of Ecomodernism,” The 





Ecomodernism reprises the main tropes of modernity, on 
growth and progress, by transmuting classic liberalism into 
neoliberalism.70 It is a market-obsessed discourse that sits 
comfortably alongside developmentalist narratives such as sus-
tainable development due to the substantial overlaps between 
modernisation theory and ecological modernisation.71 To eco-
modernists, we have not been modern enough. Having learned 
nothing and forgotten nothing, they advocate market solutions 
to climate change and ecological destruction according to the 
perverse logic that the only way to save nature from the dep-
redations of the market is to commodify and monetize it.72 For 
ecomodernists, the end of nature is inconsequential because the 
end of nature constitutes an opportunity to remake it in Man’s 
image — in a good, profitable Anthropocene form. Technology 
is seen as a tool to save humanity from the harms wrought by 
technology during the Holocene experiment with the Earth sys-
tem — unrestrained technological interventions can be made to 
yield unending profits using unproven technologies.73 From this 
perspective, the Anthropocene is the continuation of the En-
lightenment story of domination and progress. Ecomodernists 
celebrate the prospects of a “good” Anthropocene in which un-
reason, faith, and technological fetishism combine to perpetu-
ate the illusion that planetary catastrophe will be averted with 
70 Erik Swyngedouw, “CO2 as Neoliberal Fetish: The Love of Crisis and the 
Depoliticized Immuno-Biopolitics of Climate Change Governance,” in The 
SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism, eds. Damien Cahill, Melinda Cooper, 
Martijn Konings, and David Primrose (London: Sage, 2018), 295–307.
71 Adelman, “The Sustainable Development Goals”; Ariel Salleh, “Neoliberal-
ism, Scientism and Earth System Governance,” in The International Hand-
book of Political Ecology, ed. Raymond L. Bryant (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2015), 432–46.
72 Ryan Gunderson, “Commodification of Nature,” in The International 
Encyclopedia of Geography: People, the Earth, Environment and Technology, 
ed. Douglas Richardson (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 1–20.
73 Shellenberger and Nordhaus, “An Ecomodernist Manifesto.” See also Clive 
Hamilton, “The Theodicy of the ‘Good Anthropocene’,” Environmental 
Humanities 7, no. 1 (2016): 233–38.
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the discovery of a technological silver bullet (which is doubtless 
already patented).74
There is thus a chronological disjuncture between the tena-
cious persistence of the rationality of Holocene modernity and 
of Anthropocene “post”-modernity. We live in a period in which 
zombie categories — neoliberalism and Holocene onto-episte-
mologies — continue to dominate despite being incommensu-
rate with the scale and urgency of the climate and environmen-
tal crises. The contradictions of the Holocene metamorphose in 
the Anthropocene because, in Antonio Gramsci’s words, “[t]he 
crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the 
new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of mor-
bid symptoms appear.”75
2.3.2 Neoliberalism
The latent contradictions at the heart of capitalist modernity, 
between science and reason, between the laws of nature and 
individual autonomy and freedom, and between economic 
growth and ecological sustainability, erupted with the spread of 
market fundamentalism and neoliberal globalisation. Whereas 
mainstream neoclassical economists regarded markets as means 
of achieving ends such as social justice or individual wellbeing, 
neoclassical economics conflated markets and society and views 
competition as an iron rule of nature.76 This dismal econom-
ics reduced Homo sapiens to feral competitors, market actors, 
bloodless profit-and-loss calculators, and efficiency maximiz-
ers — the economic counterparts to abstract legal personality. 
Unreason elevated (or reduced) neoliberalism to an article of 
faith, a quasi-religion at odds with the precepts of Enlighten-
74 Calls to geoengineer the Earth’s climate will increase as average global 
temperature increases. See Sam Adelman, “Geoengineering: Rights, Risks 
and Ethics,” Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 8, no. 1 (2017): 
119–38.
75 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence 
& Wishart, 1971), 276.
76 Jason Read, “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the 
Production of Subjectivity,” Foucault Studies 6 (2009): 25–36.
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ment, a triumph whose hollowness is measured by the Great 
Recession, Brexit, Trump, the climate crisis, and the shambolic 
responses of the US and UK to the coronavirus pandemic. Un-
reason dressed up as ineluctable logic led to deregulation, free 
trade, and to the privatization of the planet.77
Against reason, Friedrich von Hayek argued that only mar-
kets can deliver social justice because, unlike human beings, 
they do not discriminate.78 Hayek’s grandiose epistemological 
claim is that the market — an abstraction — is omniscient, and 
therefore the only legitimate form of knowledge because human 
values are merely subjective opinions.79 Inequality is inevitable 
but not unjust, and poverty is nobody’s fault.80 Neoliberalism 
is, of course, a deeply ideological project. As Hayek’s disciple 
Margaret Thatcher bluntly stated in her inimical way, “Econom-
ics are the method, the object is to change the heart and soul.”81
Hayek believed he was solving the central problem of mo-
dernity, that of objective knowledge. Markets revealed truth 
and delivered justice. Self-interest was pseudo-scientifically 
77 See for example, Timothy Luke, “Eco-Managerialism: Environmental 
Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation,” in Living With Nature: Environ-
mental Politics as Cultural Discourse, eds. Frank Fischer and Maarten A. 
Hajer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 103–20.
78 Friedrich A. von Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 2: The Mi-
rage of Social Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). See also 
Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 1997). 
Targeting totalitarianism, his philippic served as a generalized libertar-
ian assault on regulation, and his ersatz “scientific” economics attacked 
both the epistemological and material foundations of the Enlightenment. 
See Kasper Støvring, “The Conservative Critique of the Enlightenment: 
The Limits of Social Engineering,” The European Legacy 19, no. 3 (2014): 
335–46.
79 Friedrich A. von Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge,” Economica 4, no. 13 
(1937): 33–54, at 33, 52, et passim.
80 Raymond Plant, “Hayek on Social Justice: A Critique,” in Hayek, Co-ordi-
nation and Evolution: His Legacy in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the 
History of Ideas, eds. Jack Birner and Rudy van Zijp (London: Routledge, 
1994), 164–77, at 165.
81 Ronald Butt, “Mrs Thatcher: The First Two Years,” Sunday Times, May 
3, 1981. http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475. Another of 
Hayek’s apostles who wrought untold damage was Milton Friedman.
45
Modernity, Anthropocene, Capitalocene
made axiomatic, and value was reduced to individual prefer-
ence, opinion or, most often, to price. Today we are governed 
by big data, algorithms, and artificial intelligence that reduce 
what is most human — volition, freedom to reason, to feel, and 
to choose — and subordinate these to market consumerism en-
acted by mouse clicks.
3. Beyond (Post-)Modernity: The Grand Narratives of the 
Anthropocene
Jean-François Lyotard famously defined postmodernity as “in-
credulity towards metanarratives.”82 As we have seen, moder-
nity has been replete with metanarratives and myths such as 
the insidious idea of progress as the engine of history, driving 
humanity onwards and upwards towards the final unfolding of 
Hegel’s Spirit, Marx’s communist vision, or America’s manifest 
destiny.
It was perhaps inevitable but nonetheless ironic that the An-
thropocene — the Age of Humans — has emerged as the grand-
est of all metanarratives in which Homo sapiens is apotheosized 
as the telluric super-agent capable of transcending the mixed 
legacy of modernity, either by reflexively abjuring its excesses 
or completing the unfinished project of the moderns.83 Beck ar-
gued that the problem does not lie in modernity but in our fail-
ure to reflect upon its lessons. The essential lesson of the climate 
crisis is that reflexive modernization has failed:
82 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowl-
edge, trans. Geoff Bennington (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984), x, xxiv. Fredric Jameson argued that postmodernity emerged in 
conjunction with neoliberal globalisation. Fredric Jameson, “Notes on 
Globalization as a Philosophical Issue,” in The Cultures of Globalization, 
eds. Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1998), 54–77.
83 Hamilton, Defiant Earth, 110, argues that “turbo-charged agency was the 
essence of modernity, combining freedom of oppression with power over 




Western modernity’s belief in linear progression contradicts 
the ongoing self-disenchantment of Western modernity […] 
in the light of climate change, the apparently independent 
and autonomous system of industrial modernization has 
begun a process of self-dissolution and self-transformation. 
This radical turn marks the current phase in which mod-
ernization is becoming reflexive, which means: we have to 
open up to global dialogues and conflicts about redefining 
modernity.84
It seems we must decide with Latour whether we have never 
been modern; with Ulrich Beck, whether to reflexively embrace 
the opportunities of ecomodernism; or with Clive Hamilton, 
whether we are not yet modern enough.85
Christophe Bonneuil discerns four grand Anthropocene 
narratives: (1) the mainstream naturalist narrative, in which the 
human species is “is elevated to a causal explanatory category 
in the understanding of human history”, and simple modernity 
gives way to the reflexive modernity advocated by Beck and 
Giddens; (2) a post-nature narrative promoted by ecomodern-
ists; (3) an eco-catastrophist narrative; and (4) an eco-Marxist 
narrative.86
In the naturalist grand narrative, science is the “deus ex 
machina that was not part of the cultural–political–economical 
84 Ulrich Beck, “Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity?” 
Theory, Culture & Society 27, nos. 2–3 (2010): 254–66, at 264.
85 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern; Beck “Climate for Change;” Ham-
ilton, Defiant Earth. Haraway argues that we have never been human: 
Donna Haraway, “When We Have Never Been Human, What Is to Be 
Done?” Theory, Culture & Society 23, nos. 7–8 (2006): 135–58.
86 Christophe Bonneuil, “The Geological Turn: Narratives of the Anthro-
pocene,” in The Anthropocene and the Global Environmental Crisis, eds. 
Hamilton et al., 19. On reflexive modernity, see Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens, and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994). Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, cogently 
demonstrate that past societies were not unknowing, unreflexive, nor 
ignorant of risks to the global environment of their activities.
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nexus that made the Anthropocene, but which will now guide 
humankind and save the planet.”87 This is a discourse that re-
produces the dominant tropes of modernity, of Man’s progress 
“from environmental obliviousness to environmental con-
sciousness, of Man equaling Nature’s power, of Man repairing 
Nature.”88 The naturalist narrative “abolishes the break between 
culture and nature, between human history and the history of 
life and Earth” so that the “entire functioning of the Earth be-
comes a matter of human political choices.” 89 Bonneuil observes 
that crisis normally denotes a transitionary state, but that in the 
Anthropocene, we have passed the point of no return.90
The post-nature narrative entails a great inversion. Whereas 
modernity promised emancipation from nature’s determinism, 
in the Anthropocene, humanity is inescapably reinserted into 
an engineered environment in which it is no longer dominant. 
The rift between nature and society is closed but not healed. 
The post-nature narrative “shares — and even radicalizes — the 
Promethean tropes of the first grand narrative as well as the be-
lief that environmental awareness or reflexivity is very recent”, 
but departs from the naturalist narrative “in viewing the An-
thropocene as a story of feedback loops, connections, networks 
and hybridity that cut across most of modernity’s boundaries.”91 
Beck discerned emancipatory effects in the epochal changes of 
the Anthropocene that make possible new ways of being and 
87 Bonneuil, “The Geological Turn,” 23. Baskin (“Paradigm Dressed as Epoch: 
The Ideology of the Anthropocene,” Environmental Values 24, no. 1 (2015): 
9–29, at 16) writes that “We know, too, that the terms ‘Nature’ and ‘Culture’ 
are not universal categories, nor is there only one understanding of how 
they are connected. A range of alternative ‘ontological routes’ exist, includ-
ing those fundamentally incommensurable with the dominant perspective 
of the contemporary West and modernity, the ‘Naturalist’ approach, as 
Descola labels it. Thinking through ‘nature’ is not straightforward, but it is 
essential to any coherent concept of the Anthropocene.”
88 Ibid.





thinking by extending and deepening modernisation.92 Other 
authors have proclaimed the “end of modernity” in simpler, 
non-reflexive forms. For example, in contrast to modernizers 
who postulate a premodern natural world distinct from society, 
Latour suggests that we need to “ecologize” rather than modern-
ize, and that political ecology can transform by transcending the 
division between nature and society.93
The eco-catastrophist narrative is one of limits and finitude, 
in which endless growth and inevitable progress crash into the 
biophysical limits of the Earth system. It is characterized by “a 
non-linear and non-progressivist conceptualisation of time and 
history”, in which the climate crisis offers opportunities for al-
ternative forms of economics such as degrowth and buen vivir, 
as well as a new egalitarian, participatory politics in resilient 
post-growth societies.94 This narrative is either fatalistic or real-
istic, depending on one’s interpretations of reason and progress.
The “Capitalocene” is an eco-Marxist narrative in which the 
main driver of the Anthropocene is not undifferentiated Homo 
sapiens but capital.95 This account is theoretically and empiri-
cally plausible in light of abundant evidence of the myriad ways 
in which the logic of capital (that compels growth), the exploita-
tion of fossil fuels, faith in technoscience, and tropes about pro-
gress and developmentalism impel the rupture in the Earth sys-
tem. Capitalism emerged long before the Industrial Revolution 
but there is little doubt that capitalist relations were deepened 
and spread through the use of fossil fuels. The Capitalocene 
describes the “geology not of mankind, but of capital accu-
92 Ulrich Beck, “Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Cli-
mate Change and Risk Society?” Current Sociology 63, no. 1 (2015): 75–88.
93 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, 
trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 
and An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).
94 Bonneuil, “The Geological Turn,” 27. 
95 As Moore (Anthropocene or Capitalocene?, 50) argues, it is “an ugly word 
for an ugly system.”
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mulation” through specific sets of social relations.96 It explains 
neoliberalism, green economy, ecomodernism, and sustainable 
development in ways that the construct of the Anthropocene 
cannot, because the latter ignores or masks the structural vio-
lence of capitalism. The Capitalocene, by contrast, explains car-
bon colonialism and unequal ecological exchange. For Moore, it 
“signifies capitalism as a way of organizing nature — as a multi-
species, situated, capitalist world-ecology.”97
4. Beyond the Holocene
We await the official verdict on whether the Anthropocene is 
a new geological epoch. This is important but not decisive be-
cause the term is now widely used in the humanities, social sci-
ences, and other disciplines. What is striking, however, is the 
disjuncture signalled by the scientific implications of the An-
thropocene and the limitations of Holocene epistemological re-
sponses, many of which fit comfortably within the main tropes 
of modernity — albeit as variations on a theme. Modernity per-
dures because moderns are trapped in the iron cage of Holocene 
onto-epistemologies. Modernity is the last gasp of Holocene ra-
tionality in a period in which Kantian individuals still hubristi-
cally believe they are masters of their own fates as well as that of 
the Earth and, as such, are the point of departure for thinking in 
and about the Anthropocene. 
First, the impulse towards universalization, deployed to oblit-
erate otherness through exclusion, now becomes a mechanism 
of inclusion. “We,” an undifferentiated collective, are deemed to 
have acquired telluric super-agency and responsibility for the 
rupture to the Earth System, regardless of the vast differences 
in our historical contributions to climatic harms. Whereas the 
French and American revolutions sought to universalize the 
interests of white, bourgeois, Christian men during the Age of 
96 Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of 
Global Warming (London: Verso, 2016), 390–91.
97 Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene?, 6.
50
the great awakening
Enlightenment; the Anthropocene normalizes and universal-
izes the actions and interests of a small segment of humanity 
in the Age of Humans. Second, whereas modernity celebrated 
humanity’s liberation from nature through technological domi-
nation, the Anthropocene veers between lamenting the realiza-
tion that this freedom was illusory and reinserting “‘man’ into 
nature only to re-elevate ‘him’ within and above it.”98 Third, as 
Baskin argues, modernity’s “use of ‘instrumental reason’ gener-
ates a largely uncritical embrace of technology” which, in the 
hands of ecomodernists, “legitimises certain non-democratic 
and technophilic approaches, including planetary management 
and large-scale geoengineering, as necessary responses to the 
ecological ‘state of emergency’.”99 Much writing on the Anthro-
pocene criticizes the excesses of technologically-induced envi-
ronmental degradation, but much of it retains modernity’s faith 
in techno-scientific solutions. Fourth, as its name implies, the 
Anthropocene perpetuates modernity’s thoroughgoing anthro-
pocentrism.
Peter Fitzpatrick writes that “Towards the end of the period 
of Enlightenment, the sovereign subject is dethroned and there 
remains no one to do the work of the gods.”100 Nietzsche insisted 
on the necessity of confronting the full implications of the death 
of God101 (and, by implication, accepting the death of nature); 
in the Anthropocene, ecomodernists and geoengineers step for-
ward to do the work of the gods.
The Anthropocene is a metanarrative about exploitation of 
the environment, with a twist. Instead of abundance, “nature” 
is now characterized by new leitmotifs about limits, thresholds, 
and planetary boundaries. Too often, this results in a focus on 
the ecological consequences of industrial capitalism rather than 
on the underlying socio-economic, political, and legal struc-
tures that produce them. Despite this, a disconcerting faith 
98 Baskin, “Paradigm Dressed as Epoch,” 11.
99 Ibid.
100 Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (London: Routledge, 
2002), 92.
101 Hamilton, Defiant Earth, 117.
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persists in humanity’s technological capacity to overcome An-
thropocene constraints. There is also discontinuity about his-
tory. Chronologically, the advent of geo-human history implies 
that we have moved beyond modernity. In this sense, the An-
thropocene is tantamount to a new meta-historical concept that 
transcends the bounds of Holocene history, a story about the 
meaning of the past and the making of the future. A third, con-
tradictory, discontinuity concerns the nature–society binary. 
The Cartesian rupture is reconceptualized but not reconciled. In 
Anthropocene literature, human and natural systems are entan-
gled and shape each other, but are not reconciled. Nature now 
assumes a frightening otherness beyond humanity’s control that 
breeds fear and feeds Promethean urges. The clearest continuity 
is anthropocentrism because, after all, what else distinguishes 
the Age of Humans? 
The Anthropocene forces us to understand time and history 
anew because it is no longer possible to accept the modern con-
ception of history flowing from the rupture that Jacob Burck-
hardt described as “the break with nature caused by the awak-
ening of consciousness.”102 In the words of W.B. Yeats, history is 
“changed, utterly changed” by the geological super-agency of a 
section of humanity with demiurgical pretensions but limited 
power to decide geo-human history and much less. The super-
agency of some circumscribes the power of all. It is the power 
of the powerless. Postmodern theorists such as Fredric Jame-
son argued that neoliberalism had brought about fundamental 
changes in the way cultural and political history is experienced. 
From the nineteenth century onwards, the chronology of mod-
ern history was linear and teleological, with the past progres-
sively unfolding into a future whose destination seemed prede-
termined. In contrast, postmodernity was a space-time in which 
this onward march of history disintegrated into a perpetually 
rehashed present. The end of history and the triumph of liberal 
democracy and capitalism was declared at the end of the Cold 




War, even as Walter Benjamin’s angel of history was stirring a 
storm that “drives [us]irresistably into the future, to which [our 
backs are] turned, while the pile of debris before [us] grows to-
ward the sky. What we call progress is this storm.”103
A stark choice confronts us in the Age of Humans: whether 
to perpetuate the Age of Unreason or follow a different path. 
Marx wrote that “Reason has always existed, but not always in 
a reasonable form.”104 During the Anthropocene, the logic of 
capital has proved more powerful than autonomous, sovereign 
Kantian rationality. We might dispute Latour’s conclusion that 
“modernity is a concept, not a thing that happened” on the ba-
sis that the Anthropocene is the materialization of modernity 
but, nonetheless, concur that “[w]e have never been modern 
in the very simple sense that while we emancipated ourselves, 
each day we also more tightly entangled ourselves in the fabric 
of nature” so that “the reality of this modernisation has been its 
opposite”.105
For Clive Hamilton, “[m]odernity was not an illusion but 
the arrival of the time of greatest promise and greatest danger, 
each represented by real social forces that have fought out the 
great political and social battles.”106 Hamilton inveighs against 
the Kantian subject and post-humanist approaches — the latter 
because they tend to discount human agency and belittle hu-
manity and its achievements: 
The Anthropocene shows up humans as super-agents, pow-
erful even beyond the imaginings of the Moderns, the agent 
who broke the bounds of Cartesian subjectivity to enter into 
103 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man; Walter Benjamin, “On 
the Concept of History,” in Selected Writings, Volume 4, 1938–1940, eds. 
Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006), 392. 
104 Karl Marx, “To Arnold Ruge in Kreuznach, September, 1843,” in Karl 
Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 3 (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 2010), 133–45, 143.
105 Bruno Latour, “Fifty Shades of Green,” Environmental Humanities 7, no. 1 
(2015): 219–25, at 221.
106 Hamilton, Defiant Earth, 110–11.
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the object only to find itself confronted by a power over 
which it can never prevail.107 
Our response should be acceptance of our super-agency and the 
awesome responsibility that comes with it and the magnitude of 
the choice between preservation and destruction: 
Only when we accept the greatness of the human project and 
the extreme danger that goes with it can we pose the epoch-
defining question: how are we to use our power to pacify and 
protect the Earth rather than destroy it?108
Hamilton believes that alternative cosmologies such as buen vi-
vir do not have answers to the Anthropocene:
To turn to them for answers shoulders them with an impos-
sible burden. We made the mess and “going native” ontologi-
cally is no answer. Looking upon Indigenous cultures with 
awe and regarding them as having magical potency is to fe-
tishize them, a tendency now taken so far by some as to attri-
bute to them the power to fix the climate and reverse the geo-
logical destabilization of the planet. There is no need to reject 
the historical truth of modernity and go looking among pre-
modern ontologies for an alternative. The only way forward 
is to begin from where we are, in modernity, and from there 
work toward a “beyond-modernity” way of being.109
Indigenous cosmovisions may not be the answer, but Ham-
ilton’s dismissive approach implies that there is no wisdom to 
gain from onto-epistemologies that value harmony, humility, 
and ecocentrism — not least because it is immensely difficult to 
discern answers by perpetuating the hubristic follies of moder-
nity. As noted above, Santos et al. argue knowledges operate in 
107 Ibid, 101. Emphasis in original.
108 Ibid, 111.
109 Ibid, 106. Emphasis in original.
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constellations and that there is no monolithic, singular knowl-
edge — modernist, or otherwise. Global social justice is only 
possible with global cognitive justice, which, itself, is possible 
only by “substituting a monoculture of scientific knowledge by 
an ecology of knowledges,”110 and it is this “transition from a 
monoculture of scientific knowledge to an ecology of knowl-
edges [that] will make possible the replacement of knowledge-
as regulation with knowledge-as-emancipation.”111
It appears that we are confronted with a stark choice between 
rejecting modernity, aiming to transcend it, or celebrating and 
deepening it. For Hamilton, this is Hobson’s choice because 
“there is no going back to pre-modern ontologies for an un-
derstanding; we must look ahead to the evolution of modernity 
itself, driven by its own endogenous forces and contradictions 
within a larger order.”112 The Anthropocene, he writes, “finally 
allows a clear view of what humans are” — an assertion open to 
ambiguous interpretations.113
5. Conclusion
Karl Marx begins The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte 
with the acerbic observation that history repeats itself first as 
tragedy and then as farce.114 In the following paragraph, Marx 
writes that human beings “make their own history, but they 
do not make it as they please: they do not make it under self-
selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing al-
ready, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all 
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the 
living.”115 For the foreseeable future, humankind and the Earth 
will make geo-human history under circumstances created by 
110 Santos et al., “Opening up the Canon of Knowledge,” xlviii.
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a relatively small number of human beings whose works have 
circumscribed the agency and power of all beings in the An-
thropocene.
Born in the age of reason, the Anthropocene epitomizes 
unreason, which, ironically, seems entirely appropriate in this 
post-rational, post-truth era. The Age of Enlightenment wit-
nessed the apotheosis of human beings through humanism, but 
the Age of Humans too seems like an ironic misnomer. Whereas 
modernity was predicated upon the fallacy that humanity could 
free itself from the dictates of the realm of necessity, today hu-
man beings are (re-)immersed in the nature that cannot be 
tamed. Amitav Ghosh writes, “Quite possibly then, this era, 
which so congratulates itself on its self-awareness, will come to 
be known as the time of the Great Derangement.”116 Albert Ein-
stein is reputed to have remarked that no problem can be solved 
at the same level of consciousness that created it.
It is time for a great awakening.
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